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The European Economic Interest Group
(EEIG): A New European Business
Entity
Daniel T. Murphy*
ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes the European Communities Regulation establishing the European Economic Interest Group (EEIG), a commercial entity
whose purpose is to facilitate the economic interests of its members. Dean
Murphy emphasizes that the Regulation establishes the EEIG as a Community-wide legal entity but leaves regulation of many aspects of the
EEIG's status and operation to the laws of the Member States. The Regulation institutionalizesand encourages cross-border business cooperation
while allowingflexibility. Dean Murphy analyzes the Regulation's provisions for formation, operation, and termination of the EEIG. He concludes that the EEIG will likely prove to be a convenient and popular
means for European entites and individuals to conduct business in the
EC.
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INTRODUCTION

The European Communities (EC) have long sought to adopt legislation providing for the creation and operation of EC law-based commercial entities.' A single set of Community rules, or at least twelve national
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Richmond, Virginia, LL.M.
1969, Columbia University; J.D., 1968, A.B., 1965, Villanova University.
1. See, e.g., Proposalfor a Council Regulation on the Statutefor a European Company, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 263) 41 (1989) (Commission); Amended Proposal
for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3Xg) of the EEC Treaty Concerning the
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sets of substantively similar national rules, would govern the formation
and operation of such legal entities.2 Since such entities would not be
subject to differing regulations among the Member States, they could
operate transnationally more efficiently than their purely national lawregulated cousins. These entities would thus both facilitate the attainment of the EC-wide single internal market and be in a position to exploit it.
The adoption in July 1985 of the Regulation on the European Economic Interest Grouping' (the Regulation) brought the Council of the
European Communities its first success, albeit a modest one, in achieving
this goal. This Regulation establishes a new form of commercial legal
entity within the EC and sets forth the rules for its formation and operation. European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIGs) may be formed
and operated under the Regulation after July 1, 1989.,
The law creating the EEIG entity is an EC regulation. Consequently
the legislation is directly applicable within the Member States.' The legislation is both EC law and a statutory law binding within each of the

Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983) (Commission); Amended Proposalfor
a Council Regulation on the Statutefor European Companies, 8 BULL. E.C. 9 (Supp. 4
1975); Proposalfor a Regulation on the Council on the European Cooperation Grouping (ECG), 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 14) 30 (1974) (Commission) [hereinafter Origi-

nal Proposal];Proposalfor a Fifth Directive to Coordinatethe Safeguards Which, for
the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, are Required by Member States
of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraphof Article 58 of the EEC
Treaty, as Regards the Structure of Socits Anonymes and the Powers and Obligations
of Their Organs, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 49 (1972) (Commission), reprinted
in 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983); Proposalfor a Draft Statute for European Companies, 13 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 124) 1 (1970) (Commission).
2. If the European Communities' (EC) rules were set forth in regulations, they
would constitute one set of precepts becoming directly part of the national law of the
Member States, superseding any inconsistent national laws. If EC rules were promulgated by directives, the Member States would be obligated to enact national legislation
containing the substance of the EC directive. Under the regulation approach, there would'
be only one effective set of rules at the EC level and within the Member States; under
the directive approach at best there would be 12 sets of, ideally, consistent national laws.
See generally D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 113-26 (4th ed. 1987).

3. Council Regulation on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEC) No.
2137/85, 28 O.J. EUR. ComM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985) [hereinafter Regulation]; 20
BULL. E.C. 1 (Supp. 3 1987); see Appendix.
4. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 43.
5. Regulation, supra note 3; 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (no. L. 199), at 9.
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twelve Member States as part of its national law.' The EEIG thus has
"dual citizenship." As a result, in addition to the traditional forms of
doing business available under the national laws of the Member States,
such as partnerships and limited liability companies, a new European
entity now exists.
While the EEIG has the distinction of being the first commercial entity created by Community legislation, it is only partially formed by
Community rules. The Regulation leaves many essential aspects of the
EEIG's legal status and operation to national legislation.' Moreover, the
Regulation specifically sanctions differing national law provisions on
many important points regarding the EEIG's operation.' Consequently,
the Regulation does not really create a transnational entity governed by
one set of rules. The structure and some specifics will be uniform
throughout the Community, but each Member State may develop its
own rules regarding other aspects, and these rules can vary widely
among the Member States. This gives rise to some inefficiencies and un9
certainties as well as to some serious conflict of laws issues.
II.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE

EEIG

The Regulation patterns the EEIG on a French business form, the
Groupment d'inter~t 6conomique (GIE), which has been well received in
France"0 since it was introduced into French law in 1967.11
The EEIG concept is not new to the EC. Like other EQ initiatives in
the corporate law area, 2 the European Commission initially proposed
the EEIG in the early 1970s;3 the concept languished, however, through
the 1970s and early 1980s. Work on the Original Proposal intensified
6. See supra note 2; Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, 1963
E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 105; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 2, at
300-16.
7. See, e.g., infra notes 41-42, 71-76 and accompanying text. The Preamble to the
Regulation acknowledges that states are free to adopt laws and regulations not in conflict
with the scope or object of the Regulation. Regulation, supra note 3, preamble, para. 22.
8. See, e.g., infra note 40 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
10. See J. LE GALL, FRENCH COMPANY LAW 28-36 (1974). As of June 1985 over
9000 GIEs were registered. Most of these are small or medium-sized enterprises. Airbus
Industries is a notable large scale venture operated as a GIE. Commission of the European Communities, Press Release No. IP (85) 292, at 1 & n.2 (June 27, 1985) [hereinafter Press Release].
11. Ordonnance No. 67-281 du 23 Sept. 1967, J.O. 28 Sept., at 9537, 1967 D.S.L.
361 (Fr.).
12. See supra note 1.
13. Original Proposal,supra note 1.
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after 1983 due to a concentrated emphasis by the Commission on measures intended to encourage cooperation between companies of differing
Member States, thereby increasing the EC's competitiveness."'
The EEIG is intended to be a transnational entity through which its
members can cooperate and take joint action for their mutual advantage.
It resembles a partnership or a joint venture but is more structured than
either. Moreover, some of the Regulation's provisions are quite inconsistent with the common law understanding of either. Contractual cooperation in the form of a joint venture of course remains possible among the
other legal entities existing under national law. The advantage that the
EEIG provides, and indeed the gap among the national laws that it fills,
is the institutionalization of this contractual flexibility. National law has
created numerous commercial entities subject to fairly rigid rules. These
entities were able to achieve a certain amount of flexibility through contractual cooperation with each other. The EEIG takes that previously
available contractual cooperation one step further. The Regulation gives
the contractual arrangement the status of a separate legal entity, the
EEIG, and protects it as such.1" The EEIG not only, protects and en-

14. The immediate predecessor of the EEIG, the European Cooperation Grouping,
was the subject of the Original Proposal the Commission put forth in February 1974.
The Economic and Social Committee of the Community approved the Original Proposal
a year later, Avia sur une proposition de rkgliglement (CEE) du Conseil relatifa la
l'institution d'un groupement europ~en de cooperation (GEC) 18 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 108) 46 (1975), as did the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament,
Report on the Proposal From the Commission of the European Communities to the
Council (doc. 340/73) for a Regulation on the European Cooperative Grouping
(ECG), 1976-1977 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 519/76) (Jan. 21, 1977) [hereinafter Legal
Affairs Report]. The Commission redrafted the proposed regulation in view of the comments of the Parliament and resubmitted it to the Council in 1978. Amended Proposal
for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the European Cooperation Grouping (ECG), 21
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 103) 4 (1978) [hereinafter Amended Proposal].Active review
of the Amended Proposal did not take place for several years. The Commission and the
Council's attentions were focused on other corporate proposals such as the Draft Statute
on the European Company and several of the company law directives. For the Council's
answers to questions from Parliament regarding progress on the Amended Proposal, see
22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 15) 10 (1979); 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 30) 5 (1982)
(Response to Written Question No. 1050/81). Work on the Regulation creating the
EEIG greatly intensified in late 1983 as part of the Commission's effort to increase the
competitiveness of EC-based industries by encouraging cooperation between companies.
Press Release, supra note 10, at 1. The Regulation was approved July 25, 1985. Regulation, supra note 3.
15. For example, the partnership and joint venture existing under United Kingdom
law are largely contractual, but they are not legal persons. The nearest national law
relative to the EEIG, the GIE, was established in French law to fill the gap in the law
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courages cooperation among national entities, but it also directly encourages cross-border cooperation."6 By lifting some of the legal barriers to
cooperation caused by the national rules governing partnerships and
other forms of doing business, the EBIG may also lift some of the fiscal
and psychological barriers, thereby encouraging the single market. I
The Regulation clearly carries forward this concept of flexibility and
cooperation with other entities. 8 Article 3(1) of the Regulation states the
purposes for which an EEIG may be formed:
The purpose of [an EEIG] shall be to facilitate or develop the economic
activities of its members and to improve or increase the results of those
activities; its purpose is not to make profits for itself.
Its activity shall be related to the economic activities of its members and
must not be more than ancillary to those activities."
Although broadly stated, this purpose clause places definite parameters on the operation of an EEIG. First, the EEIG's activities must be
related to the economic activities of its members; second, the EEIG's activities must not be more than ancillary to the economic activities of its
members. The Council has highlighted these restrictions on the EEIG's
activities. In explaining the characteristics of the EEIG in the Preamble
to the Regulation, the Council contrasts the EEIG with a firm or company. While a firm pursues its own purposes, the EEIG merely facilitates the development of the members' economic activities, enabling them
to improve their own results.20
The most likely activities permitted among members of an EEIG
would include research and development activities, joint buying, selling,
or manufacturing activities, or the formation of consortiums to bid on
projects and manage the performance of the resulting contracts. 2 1 Cer-

not filled by other business entities, principally the Association, which forbids profitmaking on the one hand, and the Soci&6, which requires a profit-making goal on the
other. Like the EEIG, the GIE encourages link-ups and is a recognized legal form. See
generally Legal Affairs Report, supra note 14, at 30-32 (Annex); Press Release, supra
note 10, at 1.
16.

See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.

17. See Press Release, supra note 10.
18. See Introduction to the Regulation, 20 BULL. E.C. 7 (Supp. 3 1987) [hereinafter
Introduction].
19. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(1).
20. Id. preamble, para. 9.
21. See Israel, The EEIG-A Major Step Forwardfor Community Law, 9 CoMPANY LAw. 14, 15 (1986); Barnard & Earle, Overview of the EEC Legislative Program
in the Field of Company Law, in PRACTISING LAW INSTrruTE, SERIES No. 493, 1992,
THE CHANGING LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR DOING BusiNEss IN EUROPE 130 (1989).
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tain support services for members, such as accounting or technical assistance, would also likely fit within permitted activities because they would
be related and ancillary to members' economic activities. But, unless the
scope of these services is narrowly confined, article 3(2)(a) of the Regulation may prohibit them. Article 3(2)(a) prevents an EEIG from exercising, directly or indirectly, the power of management or supervision
over members' activities in fields such as personnel, finance, and investment." The rationale seems to be that if an EEIG took on such functions for its members, its operation would become essential to the vitality
of the members, and thus not ancillary.2" This determination that the
EEIG remain at all times subordinate, and not essential, to the members
also explains the provisions in the Regulation that the EEIG not own
shares in its members2" and that it remain relatively small, employing
less than 500 persons.2 5
An EEIG may make a profit. Such profits are deemed profits of the
members to be apportioned according to the contract, or divided equally

22. Regulation, supra note 2, art. 3(2)(a).
23. This interpretation seems clear from the language of the Regulation itself. After
articulating in article 3(1) the purposes for which an EEIG may be formed, the Regulation states the exclusions from permitted activity. Article 3(2)'s listing of these exclusions
begins "Consequently . . . [an EEIG] may not: (a) exercise, directly or indirectly, a
power of management or supervision over its members' own activities ... in particular in
the fields of personnel, finance and investment . . . ." Id. art. 3(2)(a). Use of the word
"consequently" implies that these exclusions follow from the requirement that the
EEIG's activities be ancillary to the economic activities of the members.
The EEIG is probably not available to professionals as a means of practicing their
profession in a cross-border context. An entity such as an EEIG or a partnership might
be prohibited from engaging in the practice of the profession by the ethical or other
professional regulatory rules of the Member States. It is not the intent of the Regulation
to supersede such rules. Israel, supra note 21, at 16. Also, the purpose of the EEIG must
be ancillary to the economic activities of the members. Practicing a profession through an
EEIG would mean that the EEIG was engaged on a sustained basis in the same economic activity as its members. The Preamble explicitly addresses this point. It states that
the EEIG's activities may not replace those of the members, so that the EEIG "may not
itself, with regard to third parties, practise a profession, the concept of economic activities
being interpreted in the widest sense." Id. preamble, para. 9. Nonetheless, at least one
British law firm has established an EEIG with lawyers or firms in other EC Member
States, apparently for the purpose of building a EC-wide practice. InternationalLawyer,
Times (London), July 18, 1989, at 31, col 1. Employees of the EEIG are probably not
practicing law on behalf of the EEIG, but providing support for the practitioner
members.
24. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(2)(b).
25. This limitation on the number of persons an EEIG may employ also removes the
EEIG from the German "worker participation" rules, which generally apply to businesses with more than 500 employees. Israel, supra note 21, at 15.
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if there is no contract provision regarding profit sharing."
Membership in the EEIG is widely available to persons engaged in a
business or profession within the EC. Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation
makes membership in an EEIG available to companies or firms as defined in the Treaty of Rome27 that have their registered or statutory
office and central administration in a Member State, and to natural persons carrying on industrial, commercial, craft, or agricultural activity, or
providing professional or other services within the EC.28 Member States
may limit the number of members in an EEIG to twenty, and prohibit,
on grounds of public interest, participation by certain classes of
persons.29
While all EEIG members must be nationals of a Member State, the
Regulation assures the EEIG's transnational character by requiring diversity of nationality among the EEIG members. All EEIG members
cannot be of the same Member State."0 The nationality test used for this
diversity determination is the functional one from the civil law. For individuals, the determination is based on the state of principal business or
professional activity. For companies or firms, it is the state of central
administration.3 1 Although the list of persons qualifying for membership
in an EEIG as stated in article 4(1)(a) includes companies having both
their registered offices and central administration within the EC, the diversity test of article 4(2) is based solely on central administration. 2
This diversity test is a realistic one assuring the EEIG a transnational
character. Registration, like incorporation, is a formal, legal process, and
the state in which it takes place may be unrelated to the functional administration of the company. Hence diversity among states of registration
would not sufficiently assure the transnational character of the venture.3 3

26.

Regulation, supra note 3, art. 21(1).

27. The Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1967, art. 58, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
28. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 4(1)(a), (b).
29. Id. art. 4(3), (4).
30. Id. art. 4(2).
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 4(2)(a). United States corporations cannot become members of an EEIG,
but their EC-based subsidiaries can. A United States incorporated corporation based
within and having its central administration within the EC would meet the diversity test
of article 4(2). Id. art. 4(2). It would not, however, meet the threshold test of article 4(1),
which provides that membership in an EEIG is available only to corporations having
both their registered or statutory office and their central administration within the EC.
Id. art. 4(1). A subsidiary of a United States parent that is incorporated and has its
central administration in an EC country would qualify as a member in an EEIG.
33. Members of the EEIG can all have the same state of registration within the EC
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EEIG

Formation of an EEIG is a simple matter. There are only two "statutory" requirements for its creation and operation-the execution of a
contract among the members, and the registration of the EEIG in the
registry of the state in which its official address, as stated in the contract,
is located. 4 The contract is both a constitutive document and an operational one. The contract, molded to the particular needs of its members
and the venture, achieves the flexible nature of the EEIG.
The Regulation's other mandatory contract provisions are fairly
straightforward: the name of the EEIG; recitation of the members' objects (purposes) for forming the EEIG; the identity and address of the
members; and the EEIG's duration, unless it is indefinite. Scattered
throughout the Regulation are numerous optional provisions that the
members may include in the contract. 5 The Regulation does not state
that the mandatory and listed optional clauses are the only allowable
provisions. Thus, there appears to be no prohibition against including in
the contract clauses not referred to in the Regulation. Indeed, their allowance is consistent with the contractual nature of the entity. 8
Registration is the act conferring legal existence on the EEIG. Registration must take place in the registry of the state of the EEIG's official
address, as named in the contract. Article 1(2) states the consequence
of registration: the EEIG has "capacity, in its own name, to have rights
and obligations of all kinds, to make contracts or accomplish other legal
acts, and to sue and be sued." '
Curiously, the sections immediately following article 1 blur the status
or legal capacity of the EEIG. Article 1(3) states that the Member States
shall determine whether the EEIG has legal personality.3 9 Thus, although article 1(2) provides the EEIG with the right to perform a wide
range of legal acts as an entity, including presumably the right to hold
at the outset of the venture, or at any time during its life. But diversity of state of central
administration as required by article 4(2) must continually exist. If a member moved its
state of central administration so that this diversity were destroyed (moved it to the same
state as that of the other members or outside the EC), the venture would cease to qualify
as an EEIG, and its affairs would have to be wound up. Id. art. 31(3).
34. Id. arts. 1, 5, 6.
35. Id. art. 5.
36. See, e.g., infra notes 52-53, 91 and accompanying text. The validity and interpretation of such clauses in all likelihood, however, would be governed by the law of the
state of the official address.
37. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 6.
38. Id. art. 1(2).
39. Id. art. 1(3).
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and transfer title to real property, maintain bank accounts, and transfer
money, article 1(3) limits this right by allowing each Member State to
determine independently whether an EEIG formed by registration in its
registry has full legal personality. These provisions leave open the possibility of different and inconsistent national rules regarding the legal status of the EEIG.4 °
Article 2 of the Regulation points up the extreme care that should be
used in selecting the state of the EEIG's official address. This article
provides that, subject to the provisions of the Regulation itself, the law of
the state of the official address is the law applicable to the contract and
to the internal operation of the EEIG. 41 Hence, important issues involving interpretation and performance of the contract and available remedies in the event of breach, as well as many of the issues surrounding the
operation of the entity, must be resolved by the law of the state of official
address. As a citizen of the state of official address, the EEIG will also
be subject to all the other laws of that state, except as may be otherwise
provided.42
Despite the critical importance of this matter, members of the EEIG
do not have complete freedom to decide the site of the official address.
Article 12 narrows the possible number of states by providing that the
official address, as stated in the contract, must be in either the state in
which
the EEIG will have its central administration or the state in
1
40. One explanation for this curious provision in article 1(3) is the incidence of
taxes. In some Member States, such as Italy and Germany, entities with legal personality
pay taxes, as do their members. Israel, supra note 21, at 17. The EEIG is structured so
that only the members pay taxes. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. Consequently, Member States with legal personality taxes should decide that the EEIG does
not have legal personality. To do otherwise would make their national regulation inconsistent with the paramount Regulation. Presumably other Member States could confer
full legal personality on the EEIG.
41. Article 2(1) excepts matters relating to the status or capacity of natural persons
and the capacity of legal persons from this choice of law provision. Regulation, supra
note 3, art. 2(1). Presumably these issues would be resolved by the law of the state of the
person's nationality, or its siege.
42. Among the important matters involved in the operation of the entity that are left
to the national law are the fiduciary duty and level of care owed by the manager, insolvency, and liquidation, as well as relevant accounting rules. See, e.g., id. arts. 36, 35(2);
Israel, supra note 21, at 21 n.55.
The hierarchy of law applicable to the EEIG is as follows: (1) the Regulation; (2) the
terms of the contract among the members; (3) EC law, and the national law of the state
of official address. Obviously the validity and enforcement of the contract provisions referred to in (2) are subject to (3), and the Regulation makes this explicit. Id. art. 2(1).
Among the other national laws applicable to the EEIG are the labor and social laws,
competition laws, and intellectual property laws. Id. preamble, para. 19.
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which one of the members has its central administration,
so long as the
43
EEIG will also carry on some activity there.
The Regulation sets forth the documents that, in addition to the contract, must be filed in the registry of the state of official address. These
documents are public records and serve as notice to parties doing business with the EEIG.44
To assure the flexibility of the entity and encourage its use, there are

no special capital requirements as a condition to the formation or operation of the EEIG.' 5 The members may provide financing necessary for
the EEIG's operations either as "contributions to equity" or as loans.
Members can make all types of contributions to the entity, including
cash, contributions in kind, or services. It is also possible to make no
contributions to the entity. 48 Loans by third parties appear to be allowed
as well.47 Public investment in the enterprise is not allowed.4
Article 16(1) of the Regulation requires two organs within the
EEIG-the members acting collectively and the manager; these two organs are responsible for the entity's decision-making and mangement a9

43. Article 13 allows the transfer of the official address to another state meeting the
criteria of article 12. Id. art. 13.
44. Id. arts. 7, 8, 9. In addition to the contract, the following documents and notices
must be filed in the registry: (a) any amendment to the contract, including any change in
membership; (b) notice of setting up or closing down any establishment of the EEIG; (c)
any judicial decision declaring the EEIG a nullity; (d) notice of the appointment or
termination of the appointment of a manager, including the names and any other identification particularly required by the law of the state of registration; (e) notice of assignment of participation; (f) decisions of the membership or judiciary regarding winding up;
(g) notice of the appointment and the termination of appointment of a liquidator; (h)
notice of conclusion of liquidation; (i) any proposal to change the state of official address;
(j) any clause exempting new members from liability for preadmission debts. Id. art. 7.
45. See Israel, supra note 21, at 18.
46. Introduction, supra note 18, at 8.
47. See Israel, supra note 21, at 19 n.37. Such loans are not specifically provided for,
nor are they prohibited, see, however, infra note 84 and accompanying text regarding
security interests. A lender could not, however, by virtue of the loan investment, become
a member of the EEIG, thereby obtaining a voice in the EEIG's management to protect
its investment. Article 4, which lists the persons eligible for membership, would not preclude membership by an otherwise qualified person whose only interest in the venture is
to protect its investment. Article 3, regarding the EEIG's purpose, states that the EEIG
is to facilitate the economic activities of its members, and its activity must be related to
those of the members. Thus, a passive investor whose interest is protection of its investment would not qualify as a member. Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 3, 4.
48. Id. art. 23.
49. Id. art. 16(1). Other organs can be established and their roles stated in the contract. Id. art. 16(1).
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The members acting as a body are the ultimate decision-making body;
they have plenary power to make any decision directed toward achieving
the EEIG's purposes."
Each member must have at least one vote for decision-making purposes.5 1 The contract may give some members more votes, but no member may have a majority of the votes.52 Since the EEIG is intended to
function on the basis of consensus among the members, the Regulation
provides that all measures require unanimous assent, unless otherwise
stated in the contract.5" The contract can provide that certain measures
can be adopted with less than unanimous approval. For any such measures the contract can set forth quorum provisions and establish the
number or percentage of votes necessary for adoption. 5' Certain measures, regardless of the contract, can be adopted only by unanimous decision. These include: alteration of the purpose of the EEIG; alteration of
the allocation of votes or the number necessary for adoption of measures;
alteration of the EEIG's duration; alteration of the members' contribution to the EEIG's financing; and changes to the contract.
The Regulation does not require periodic meetings of the members.
But the manager of the EEIG must arrange for members to be consulted
regarding a matter whenever so requested by a member. The manager
can also arrange for consultation on the manager's own initiative. 56 The
manager can thereby protect itself from later charges of overstepping its
authority. Each member is entitled to obtain information from the manager regarding the business and to inspect the EEIG's books and

50. Id. art. 16(2). This power is subject to the terms of the contract, which in turn
may be modified by the members. Id. arts. 17(3), (2)(g).
51. Id. art. 17(1). See also supra note 50.
52. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 17(1).
53. The Regulation awkwardly and backhandedly states the presumption of unanimity using "unless otherwise provided in the contract" language. At first reading article 17
gives the impression that majority voting is presumed except for specified matters. Article
17(1) states that each member has one vote, except that the contract can assign certain
members more than one vote, but less than a majority of the votes. Article 17(2) lists
measures requiring unanimous vote, regardless of the contract. Article 17(3) states that,
except where unanimity is required, the contract may set quorum and voting majority
rules. It is only in the last sentence of article 17(3) that the majority voting presumption
shifts. That sentence states that unless otherwise provided in the contract, all decisions
shall be unanimous. Id. art. 17(3).
54. Id. art. 17(3).
55. Id. art. 17(2). These last two unanimity requirements actually may be altered by
contract so long as the first unanimity requirements remain inviolate. Id. art. 17(2)(f),
(g).
56. Id. art. 17(4).
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57

records.
The business of the EEIG is to be managed by the manager. The
Regulation invests this person with extremely broad powers to the exclusion of the members. Only the manager may represent the EEIG in
dealings with third parties. 8 The manager's acts are binding on the
EEIG and its members even if they are outside the EEIG's purposes. 9
The contract, or a unanimous decision of the members, determines the
terms of the appointment and removal of the manager and sets forth the
manager's powers.6
Since the manager's acts, even those outside the EEIG's stated purposes, are binding on the members, the articulation of the manager's authority in the contract or by unanimous decision is to a large extent effective only internally. It is an allocation of responsibility between the
manager and the members, having limited effect on third parties. 1 From
the perspective and for the benefit of third parties dealing with the manager, the authority of the manager is plenary and virtually unlimited.
This situation encourages third parties to deal with the manager.
Third parties need not be concerned about who has authority to act on
behalf of the EEIG, nor must they investigate the manager's authority.
Only when the manager and the members show that the third party
knew or could not have been unaware of the manager's lack of authority
can the EEIG and its members escape responsibility for the acts of the
manager beyond the manager's powers.2 This very narrow ultra vires
rule parallels that applicable to directors of limited liability companies as
set forth in the Council's First Directive.6 3 Publication of the contract or
the unanimous decision of the members setting forth the ambit of the
manager's authority is not in itself sufficient proof of such knowledge. 4
Hence, although the publication of the contract is for the benefit of third
57. Id. art. 18.

58. Id. art. 20(1).
59. Id.
60. Id. art. 19(3).
61. Such a recitation of the manager's authority is extremely important as between
the managers and the members. It may supplement the law of the state of official address
on some important matters such as mismanagement and fiduciary duty. See infra note 66
and accompanying text.
62. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 20.
63. First Council Directive of March 9, 1968, on Coordination of Safeguards,
Which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, Member States Require of Companies Within the Meaning of Article 58 of the EEC Treaty, with a View to
Making Such SafeguardsEquivalent Throughout the Community, 11 O.J. EUR. COmM.
(No. L 68) 11 (1968).
64. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 20(1).
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parties, they are not charged with knowledge of it. Moreover, the EEIG
or its members may not rely upon express limitations on the manager's
powers, whether in the published contract or as a published decision of
the members, to defeat the claims of third parties absent the third party's
knowledge of such decision of contract."s
The Regulation contains no provision regarding the relationship between the members of the EEIG and the manager, or the manager's
accountability, other than the provision allowing a statement of the manager's powers in the contract. Hence the law of the state of official address will govern all questions of responsibility for ultra vires acts, mismanagement, or breach of duty."6 But members presumably could place
provisions regarding these matters in the contract.
Any natural person may be a manager unless the national authorities
have that person from serving in the administrative or management body
of a company. 67 Member States may allow legal persons to act as managers so long as a natural person represents the legal person.6" There is
no prohibition on the manager's being an employee of or being otherwise
affiliated with one of the members. One of the members itself could be a
manager.
Members of the EEIG have unlimited joint and several liability for
the EEIG's debts and other liabilities. As stated in the Regulation, the
members are liable for the EEIG's "debts and other liabilities of
whatever nature.""9 The origin or type of liability is hence irrelevant.
Before a third party can proceed against a member to enforce an obligation of the EEIG, the third party must make demand for payment on
the EEIG, and the obligation must remain unsatisfied for an appropriate
time.7 0 The Regulation rather blandly and unsatisfactorily expands on

65. Id.
66. Article 32(2) of the Regulation provides that on application of a member a court
may order the EEIG's winding up "on just and proper grounds." Id. art. 32(2). This
provision gives rise to the possibility that a member could seek liquidation of the EEIG if
grievances or liabilities among the members, or between the members and the manager,
were not satisfactorily resolved. It may also give the court some supervisory authority
over the EEIG.
67. Id. art. 19(1). This bar may arise under the law applicable to the individual, the
law of the state in which the EEIG has its official address, or a judicial or administrative
decision within, or recognized in, any Member State.

68. Id. art. 19(2). This is a change from the laws of most Member States, which
allow only natural persons to be managers or directors. Israel, supra note 21, at 18.
69. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 24(1).
70. Id. art. 24(2). This provision envisions simply a demand made and unmet for a
reasonable period. It does not imply that the members are liable only after formal judicial proceedings in which a judgment has been obtained and remains unsatisfied. Israel,
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this liability provision by stating that "[n]ational law shall determine the
consequences of such [joint and several] liability. 7 1 Unfortunately, the
Regulation gives no guidance as to which national law governs this significant point. Article 2 states that "[s]ubject to the provisions of this
Regulation, the law applicable.., to the contract... [and] to the internal organization.. ." of the EEIG shall be the law of the state of official
address. 72 The procedural and substantive issues surrounding enforcement of a member's joint and several liability to a third party, however,
involve neither the contract nor the EEIG's internal organization and
hence have little to do with the state of official address. Moreover, by
juxtaposing the statement in article 24(1) that national law determines
the consequences of joint and several liability with the introductory
phrase in article 2(1), "[s]ubject to the provisions of this Regulation
* * * ,,
one can argue that national law other than that of the state of
official address should be applied. By article 2(1), the national law of the
state of official address applies. There would be no need to restate in
article 24(1) that national law applies if the national law intended were
that of the state of official address. The explicit statement in article 24(1)
that national law governs is meaningful only if it is the national law of a
state other than the state of official address. 4 The most likely other
choices are the law of the state of the place of the debt or of the siege of
the member against which enforcement is sought.7 5 A contract between
the EEIG and the third party, however, can limit a member's potential
supra note 21, at 19.
71. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 24(1).
72. Id. art. 2(1).
73. Id.
74. Moreover, if that were the drafters' intent, it would have been easy enough in
article 24(1) to state that the applicable national law was to be that of the state of official
address.
75. An example of the differing ambit of joint and several responsibility, depending
on the law applied, is the question of specific performance. By article 24(1), the member's obligation extends to all of the EEIG's obligations of whatever nature. Id. art.
24(1). Suppose that an EEIG defaulted on a contract to provide services to a third party,
and the third party sought to enforce the obligation against a member. The Regulation
deals with the matter of specific performance ambiguously. The provision in article 24(1)
that the member is liable for debts and liabilities of "whatever nature" supports the
conclusion that the services must be provided. But, article 24(2) states that before a third
party can proceed against a member "for payment in respect of debts and other liabilities
. .. ," id. art. 24(2) (emphasis added), demand must be made on the EEIG and remain
unsatisfied. One could infer from this clause that the member is liable only for damages
(payment), not for performance. Given this ambiguity in the Regulation, national law
will answer the question. The national laws regarding the availability of specific performance may vary among the Member States. See Israel, supra note 21, at 19.
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liability to a third party. 6
In turn, the law of the state of the official address would arguably
govern any right of contribution the paying member might have against
the other members. This is a matter surrounding the internal organization of the entity, the rights of the members vis-a-vis one another. These
rights and obligations could also be regulated by provisions in the
contract.
Profits from the EEIG's activities are deemed to be profits of the
members, and shall be apportioned to them according to the contract, or
equally if the contract does not contain a profit sharing provision."
to the
Likewise, the members are liable for the EEIG's losses according
78
specify.
otherwise
not
does
contract
the
contract, or equally if
The EEIG is merely a "pass through" entity for tax purposes. It pays
no taxes; only its members recognize its profits and losses for tax purposes.7 9 The distribution provisions of the Regulation state that profits
and losses shall be apportioned as provided in the contract, or equally if
no contract provision exists.80 It does not require that profits in fact be
distributed annually or regularly. It is thus possible that profits will be
deemed distributed for tax purposes, although in fact they are not. The
taxing authority will be that of the member, not that of the state of official address.8 1
Any member may assign its participation in the EEIG to any other
member or to a third party with the unanimous consent of the other
members.82 The assignee does not thereby become a member of the
EEIG for liability or management purposes.8 3 Separate from an assignment, a member may grant a security interest in its participation with
the unanimous consent of the members, unless the contract otherwise

76. Regulation, supra note 3, preamble, para. 14. Such a contract provision makes
the remaining members' potential liability more real; it also raises issues of the fairness
of such a clause to the remaining members and of the manager's duty to the members.
77. Id. art. 21(1).
78. Id. art. 21(2).
79. Id. art. 40.
80. Id. art. 21(1).
81. See id. preamble, para. 18.
82. Id. art. 22(1). The term "participation" as used in article 22 is not defined. It
probably means only the right to share profits and perhaps losses, rather than decisionmaking. Article 22(1) provides that a "member... may assign his participation in the..
. [EEIGI or a proportion thereof... ." Id. art. 22 (emphasis added). This phrase seems
to limit participation to the financial return; the decision-making function cannot be
divided.
83. Id.
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provides. 8 4 The holder of a security interest may not become a member
of the EEIG by reason of the security interest.8 This is consistent with
the notion that there be no passive investor members in the EEIG.8 6
New members can gain admission to the EEIG with the unanimous
consent of the members.8" New members are generally liable for the liabilities of the EEIG on the same terms as the other members, even for
liabilities incurred before admission.8 8 The contract, or the terms of admission, may exempt the new member from pre-admission obligations.8 9
Since the contract, including the exemption clause, is published in the
registry in the state of official address, this clause will also be effective
against third parties. The same is true if the exemption is contained in
the published admission document.8 0
IV.

WITHDRAWAL FROM AND TERMINATION OF THE

EEIG

The EEIG is more structured than a partnership in terms of withdrawal. Article 27(1) of the Regulation provides that a member may
withdraw from the EEIG only according to the terms of the contract, or
if there is no contractual provision, with the unanimous consent of the
remaining members." The Regulation does not provide for withdrawal
at will. But the Regulation apparently does not outlaw contract provisions allowing withdrawal on written notice to the other members. Absent a contract provision, however, the rigorous rule of unanimous consent applies.
Upon the withdrawal or cessation of a member, the manager must
inform the remaining members of the withdrawal or cessation and file a
notice of withdrawal or cessation in the registry of the state of official
address. 2 Such notice is extremely important for limitation of the former

84. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 22(2). Apparently, contract provisions either
prohibiting the grant of security interests or allowing them with less than unanimous
approval would be permitted.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 47, and accompanying text.
87. Id. art. 26(1).
88. Id. art. 26(2).

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. If a member ceases to meet the criteria for membership set forth in article 4(1), it
ceases to be a member. Member States may provide that membership in the EEIG ceases
as provided in their insolvency or liquidations laws. Id. art. 28(1). The consequences of
cessation of membership under these rules is the same as for withdrawal with consent.
See, e.g., id. arts. 33, 34.
92. Id. art. 29.
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member's liability for obligations incurred subsequent to withdrawal.
Curiously, the Regulation does not contain a provision for outgoing
members comparable to that of article 26(2), which explicitly limits an
incoming member's liability to third parties if notice of admission is published. Article 34 provides that a member ceasing to belong to the EEIG
remains liable for debts and liabilities incurred before withdrawal or cessation on the terms of article 24. One can reasonably infer from this
sentence that publication limits liability for obligations the EEIG incurs
after withdrawal or cessation. Unfortunately, the article does not state
this explicitly.
Also, unlike a partnership, the EEIG continues in existence after the
withdrawal of a member, unless otherwise provided in the contract. 3
These two provisions regarding the consequences of withdrawal to the
withdrawing member and to the entity are quite opposite from principles
of partnership law. As between themselves, however, they are entirely
consistent. If a member can withdraw only on the terms of the contract
or with unanimous consent, it is likely that either in the contract or as
companion to the decisions to allow withdrawal, the remaining members
would have decided to continue the EEIG.
The winding up and liquidation procedures of the EEIG are a combination of specific EC rules set forth in the Regulation and national law.
Upon withdrawal the value of a member's rights and liabilities are
determined on the basis of the EEIG's assets and liabilities as they exist
at the date of withdrawal.9 The value of a member's interest cannot be
fixed in the contract or otherwise as of a date in advance of the date of
withdrawal.9 5
Winding up the EEIG can be voluntary, "quasi-voluntary," or court
ordered. The members can voluntarily wind up either unanimously or as
provided in the contract.9 In addition, the Regulation requires that the
members voluntarily decide to wind up upon the expiration of the
EEIG's stated period of existence, the accomplishment of its purpose or
the impossibility of its accomplishment, or when any other clause in the
contract requires.9 ' If the members do not make the decision to wind up
within three months of the occurrence of any of these circumstances, any

93. Id. art. 30.
94. Id. art. 33. Presumably the EEIG's financial statements and records are to be
maintained using the accounting conventions of the state of official address.
95. Id. art. 33.
96. Id. art. 31(1).
97. Id. art. 31(2)(a), (b).
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member may petition the court to order winding up." The membership
must also decide to wind up when the cross-border character of membership ceases. 9
A court ordered winding up occurs when: the EEIG is acting outside
the statutory purpose for which it was created; when the state of official
address ceases to be the functional situs of the EEIG or of one of the
members; or, when diversity among members no longer exists.' 00 For
any of these causes, a person concerned, including but not limited to a
member or a competent public authority, may seek winding up.' 0 ' The
Regulation does not state what court can order winding up in these instances, but it would probably be the appropriate court of the state of
official address. The court must order winding up unless the facts or
circumstances giving rise to the application are corrected before the court
issues a substantive ruling.0 2 The Regulation also empowers a court to
order winding up on application of a member "on just and proper
grounds.'1 03 Such grounds are certain to vary among the Member
States. In addition, the Regulation gives Member States the right to empower a court to order the winding up of an EEIG whose official address is within its territory whenever the EEIG acts against that state's
public interest. 104
The winding up of an BEIG entails its liquidation. 0 5 The national
law of the state of official address governs the liquidation,' but some
specific rules in the Regulation supersede national law on this point.
Specifically, the Regulation establishes a statutory period of limitation on
post-liquidation liability. Article 37(2) substitutes a period of five years
from the publication of notice of conclusion of liquidation for any longer
period in national law as the time within which a member is susceptible
to actions for debts or liabilities arising from the EEIG's activities. Apparently a national law limitation of less than five years would be valid.
EEIGs are subject to national law governing insolvency and cessation

98. Id. art. 31(2).
99. Id. art. 31(3).
100. Id. art. 32(1). See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
101. Id. art. 32(1).
102. Id.
103. Id. art. 32(2).
104. Id. art. 32(3). This provision only applies if the national law confers such authority on its courts regarding companies and other legal persons.
105. Id. art. 35(1).
106. Article 35(2) states that liquidation shall be governed by national law. Id. art.
35(2). It does not state which national law. It is certainly, however, that of the state of
official address.
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of payments.1 0 Again, the national law of the state of official address
would apply. All questions of priorities and members' liability in the
event of insolvency are left to the variety of Member State laws. One
specific provision in the Regulation affords members some measure of
protection. Commencement of insolvency provisions against the EEIG
does not by itself cause the commencement of such proceedings against
its members. °'
The Regulation is silent on the relation between the commencement of
insolvency proceedings against the EEIG and its winding up. Insolvency
is not one of the grounds for winding up stated in the Regulation. Under
the Regulation, however, winding up entails liquidation,' and liquidation is governed by national law. ° National law regarding insolvency
may require liquidation in the event of insolvency."' Insolvency thus
may indirectly be an additional ground for winding up in some Member
States.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since the EEIC. has become available only very recently, it is too early
to assess its popularity." 2 France's experience with the similar GIE 3
suggests that the EEIG will be widely used by small and medium-sized
firms. The requirement of cross-border diversity in membership does
make the EEIG less likely to be used for country-specific ventures. On
the other hand, the EEIG is a device through which businesses can participate in cross-border transactions that EC legislation is encouraging.
Moreover, European based subsidiaries and affiliates of United States
corporations can participate in an EEIG subject to the now more liberal
strictures of United States antitrust laws." 4 Thus, the EEIG should

107. Id. art. 36.
108. Id.

109. Id. art. 35(1).
110. Id. art 35(2).
111. See, e.g., J. LE GALL, supra note 10, at 225-26.
112. Also, since there is no EC-wide registration for the EEIG, it will be a bit more
difficult to obtain information regarding its use. Information will have to be obtained
from 12 separate commercial registers.
113. See supra note 10.
114. See supra note 32. In particular the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 49 Stat. 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C §§ 1 (note), 6a, 45(a)
(1989)). See generally Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor International Operations,
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109 (Dept. of Justice 1988); Bruce & Peirce, Understanding the Export Trading Company Act and Using (or Avoiding) Its Antitrust Exemptions, 38 Bus. LAw. 975 (1983); Murphy, Moderating Antitrust Subject Matter
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prove a useful tool for business involvement in the EC.

Jurisdiction: The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act and the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law (Revised), 54 U. CIN. L. Rtv. 779 (1986).
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COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2137/85
of 25 July 1985
on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing
the European Economic Community, and
in particular Article 235 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the
Commission("),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(2 ),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee(),
Whereas a harmonious development of
economic activities and a continuous and
balanced expansion throughout the Community depend on the establishment and
smooth functioning of a common market
offering conditions analogous to those of a
national market; whereas to bring about
this single market and to increase its
unity a legal framework which facilitates
the adaptation of their activities to the economic conditions of the Community
should be created for natural persons,
companies, firms and other legal bodies in
particular; whereas to that end it is necessary that those natural persons, companies, firms and other legal bodies should
be able to cooperate effectively across
frontiers;
Whereas cooperation of this nature can
encounter legal, fiscal or psychological
OJ No C 14, 15., 2., 1974, p. 30 and
OJ No C 103, 28., 4., 1978, p. 4.
(1)

(2)

OJ No C 163, 11., 7., 1977, p. 17.

(3)

OJ No C 108, 15., 5., 1975, p. 46.

difficulties; whereas the creation of an appropriate Community legal instrument in
the form of a European Economic Interest
Grouping would contribute to the
achievement of the above mentioned
objectives and therefore proves necessary;
Whereas the Treaty does not provide the
necessary powers for the creation of such
a legal instrument;
Whereas a grouping's ability to adapt to
economic conditions must be guaranteed
by the considerable freedom for its members in their contractual relations and the
internal organization of the grouping;
Whereas a grouping differs from a firm
or company principally in its purpose,
which is only to facilitate or develop the
economic activities of its members to enable them to improve their own results;
whereas, by reason of that ancillary nature, a grouping's activities must be related to the economic activities of its
members but not replace them so that, to
that extent, for example, a grouping may
not itself, with regard to third parties,
practise a profession, the concept of economic activities being interpreted in the
widest sense;
Whereas access to grouping form must be
made as widely available as possible to
natural persons, companies, firms and
other legal bodies, in keeping with the
alms of this Regulation; whereas this
Regulation shall not, however, prejudice
the application at national level of legal
rules and/or ethical codes concerning the
conditions for the pursuit of business and
professional activities;
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Whereas this Regulation does not itself
confer on any person the right to participate in a grouping, even where the conditions it lays down are fulfilled;
Whereas the power provided by this Regulation to prohibit or restrict participation
in grouping on grounds of public interest
is without prejudice to the laws of Member States which govern the pursuit of activities and which may provide further
prohibitions or restrictions or otherwise
control or supervise participation in a
grouping by any natural person, company, firm or other legal body or any
class of them;
Whereas, to enable a grouping to achieve
its purpose, it should be endowed with legal capacity and provision should be made
for it to be represented vis-&-vis third
parties by an organ legally separate from
its membership;
Whereas the protection of third parties
requires widespread publicity; whereas
the members of a grouping have unlimited joint and several liability for the
grouping's debts and other liabilities, including those relating to tax or social security, without, however, that principle's
affecting the freedom to exclude or restrict
the liability of one or more of its members
in respect of a particular debt or other liability by means of a specific contract between the grouping and a third party;
Whereas matters relating to the status or
capacity of natural persons and to the capacity of legal persons are governed by
national law;
Whereas the grounds for winding up
which are peculiar to the grouping should
be specific while referring to national law
for its liquidation and the conclusion
thereof;
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Whereas groupings are subject to national
laws relating to insolvency and cessation
of payments; whereas such laws may provide other grounds for the winding up of
groupings;
Whereas this Regulation provides that the
profits or losses resulting from the activities of a grouping shall be taxable only in
the hands of its members; whereas it is
understood that otherwise national tax
laws apply, particularly as regards the
apportionment of profits, tax procedures
and any obligations imposed by national
tax law;
Whereas in matters not covered by this
Regulation the laws of the Member States
and Community law are applicable, for
example with regard to:
-social and labour laws,
-competition law,
-intellectual property law;
Whereas the activities of groupings are
subject to the provisions of Member
States' laws on the pursuit and supervision of activities; whereas in the event of
abuse or circumvention of the laws of a
Member State by a grouping or its members that Member State may impose appropriate sanctions;
Whereas the Member States are free to
apply or to adopt any laws, regulations or
administrative measures which do not
conflict with the scope or objectives of this
Regulation;
Whereas this Regulation must enter into
force immediately in its entirety; whereas
the implementation of some provisions
must nevertheless be deferred in order to
allow the Member States first to set up
the necessary machinery for the registration of groupings in their territories and
the disclosure of certain matters relating
to groupings; whereas, with effect from
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the date of implementation of this Regulation, groupings set up may operate
without territorial restrictions,

AD O PT E D
HAS
REGULATION:

T H IS

2. Where a State comprises several territorial units, each of which has its own
rules of law applicable to the matters referred to in paragraph 1, each territorial
unit shall be considered as a State for the
purposes of identifying the law applicable
under this Article.

Article 1

Article 3

1. European Economic Interest Groupings shall be formed upon the terms, in
the manner and with the effects laid down
in this Regulation.

1. The purpose of a grouping shall be to
facilitate or develop the economic activities of its members and to improve or increase the results of those activities; its
purpose is not to make profits for itself.
Its activity shall be related to the economic activities of its members and must
not be more than ancillary to those
activities.

Accordingly, parties intending to form a
grouping must conclude a contract and
have the registration provided for in Article 6 carried out.
2. A grouping so formed shall, from the
date of its registration as provided for in
Article 6, have the capacity, in its own
name, to have rights and obligations of all
kinds, to make contracts or accomplish
other legal acts, and to sue and be sued.
3. The Member States shall determine
whether or not groupings registered at
their registries, pursuant to Article 6,
have legal personality.

Article 2
1. Subject to the provisions of this Regulation, the law applicable, on the one
hand, to the contract for the formation of
a grouping, except as regards matters relating to the status or capacity of natural
persons and to the capacity of legal persons and, on the other hand, to the internal organization of a grouping shall be
the internal law of the State in which the
official address is situated, as laid down in
the contract for the formation of the
grouping.

2. Consequently, a grouping may not:
(a) exercise, directly or indirectly, a
power of management or supervision
over its members' own activities or
over the activities of another undertaking, in particular in the fields of
personnel, finance and investment;
(b) directly or indirectly, on any basis
whatsoever, hold shares of any kind
in a member undertaking; the holding
of shares in another undertaking shall
be possible only in so far as it is necessary for the achievement of the
grouping's objects and if it is done on
its members' behalf;
(c) employ more than 500 persons;
(d) be used by a company to make a loan
to a director of a company, or any
person connected with him, when the
making of such loans is restricted or
controlled under the Member States'
laws governing companies. Nor must
a grouping be used for the transfer of
any property between a company and
a director, or any person connected
with him, except to the extent allowed by the Members States' laws
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governing companies. For the purposes of this provision the making of
a loan includes entering into any
transaction or arrangement of similar
effect, and property includes moveable and immoveable property;
(e) be a member of another European
Economic Interest Grouping.

Article 4
1. Only the following may be members of
a grouping:
(a) companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article
58 of the Treaty and other legal bodies governed by public or private law,
which have been formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State and which have their registered
or statutory office and central administration in the Community; where,
under the law of a Member State, a
company, firm or other legal body is
not obliged to have a registered or
statutory office, it shall be sufficient
for such a company, firm or other legal body to have its central administration in the Community;
(b) natural persons who carry on any industrial, commercial, craft or agricultural activity or who provide professional or other services in the
Community.
2. A grouping must comprise at least:
(a) two companies, firms or other legal
bodies, within the meaning of paragraph 1, which have their central administrations in different Member
States, or
(b) two natural persons, within the
meaning of paragraph 1, who carry
on their principal activities in different Member States, or

[Vol 23:1:65

(c) a company, firm or other legal body
within the meaning of paragraph 1
and a natural person, of which the
first has its central administration in
one Member State and the second
carries on his principal activity in another Member State.
3. A Member State may provide that
groupings registered at its registries in accordance with Article 6 may have no
more than 20 members. For this purpose,
that Member State may provide that, in
accordance with its laws, each member of
a legal body formed under its laws, other
than a registered company, shall be
treated as a separate member of a
grouping.
4. Any Member State may, on grounds of
that State's public interest, prohibit or restrict participation in groupings by certain
classes of natural persons, companies,
firms, or other legal bodies.

Article 5
A contract for the formation of a grouping
shall include at least:
(a) the name of the grouping preceded or
followed either by the words 'European Economic Interest Grouping' or
by the initials 'EEIG', unless those
words or initials already form part of
the name;
(b) the official address of the grouping;
(c) the objects for which the grouping is
formed;
(d) the name, business name, legal form,
permanent address or registered office, and the number and place of registration, if any, of each member of
the grouping;
(e) the duration of the grouping, except
where this is indefinite.
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Article 6
A grouping shall be registered in the
State in which it has its official address, at
the registry designated pursuant to Article
39 (1).

Article 7
A contract for the formation of a grouping
shall be filed at the registry referred to in
Article 6.
The following documents and particulars
must also be filed at that registry:
(a) any amendment to the contract for the
formation of a grouping, including
any change in the composition of a
grouping;
(b) notice of the setting up or closure of
any establishment of the grouping;
(c) any judicial decision establishing or
declaring the nullity of a grouping, in
accordance with Article 15;
(d) notice of the appointment of the manager or managers of a grouping, their
names and any other identification
particulars required by the law of the
Member State in which the register is
kept, notification that they may act
alone or must act jointly, and the termination of any manager's
appointment;
(e) notice of a member's assignment of
his participation in a grouping or a
proportion thereof, in accordance with
Article 22 (1);
(f) any decision by members ordering or
establishing the winding up of a
grouping, in accordance with Article
31, or any judicial decision ordering
such winding up, in accordance with
Articles 31 or 32;
(g) notice of the appointment of the liquidator or liquidators of a grouping, as
referred to in Article 35, their names
and any other identification particu-

lars required by the law of the Member State in which the register is kept,
and the termination of any liquidator's appointment;
(h) notice of the conclusion of a grouping's liquidation, as referred to in Article 35 (2);
(i) any proposal to transfer the official
address, as referred to in Article 14
(1);
(j) any clause exempting a new member
from the payment of debts and other
liabilities which originated prior to his
admission, in accordance with Article
26 (2).

Article 8
The following must be published, as laid
down in Article 39, in the gazette referred
to in paragraph 1 of that Article:
(a) the particulars which must be included in the contract for the formation of a grouping, pursuant to Article 5, and any amendments thereto;
(b) the number, date and place of registration as well as notice of the termination of that registration;
(c) the documents and particulars referred to in Article 7 (b) to Ci).
The particulars referred to in (a) and (b)
must be published in full. The documents
and particulars referred to in (c) may be
published either in full or in extract form
or by means of a reference to their filing
at the registry, in accordance with the national legislation applicable.
Article 9
1. The documents and particulars which
must be published pursuant to this Regulation may be relied on by a grouping as
against third parties under the conditions
laid down by the national law applicable
pursuant to Article 3 (5) and (7) of
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Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9
March 1968 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies
with the meaning of the second paragraph
of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to
making such safeguards equivalent
throughout the Community(').
2. If activities have been carried on on behalf of a grouping before its registration
in accordance with Article 6 and if the
grouping does not, after its registration,
assume the obligations arising out of such
activities, the natural persons, companies,
firms or other legal bodies which carried
on those activities shall bear unlimited
joint and several liability for them.
Article 10
Any grouping establishment situated in a
Member State other than that in which
the official address is situated shall be
registered in that State. For the purpose
of such registration, a grouping shall file,
at the appropriate registry in that Member State, copies of the documents which
must be filed at the registry of the Member State in which the official address is
situated, together, if necessary, with a
translation which conforms with the practice of the registry where the establishment is registered.
Article 11
Notice that a grouping has been formed
or that the liquidation of a grouping has
been concluded stating the number, date
and place of registration and the date,
place and title of publication, shall be
given in the Official Journal of the European Communities after it has been published in the gazette referred to in Article
39 (1).
(1) OJ No L. 65, 14. 3. 1968, p. 8.
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Article 12
The official address referred to in the contract for the formation of a grouping must
be situated in the Community.
The official address must be fixed either:
(a) where the grouping has its central administration, or
(b) where one of the members of the
grouping has its central administration or, in the case of a natural person, his principal activity, provided
that the grouping carries on an activity there.
Article 13
The official address of a grouping may be
transferred within the Community.
When such a transfer does not result in a
change in the law applicable pursuant to
Article 2, the decision to transfer shall be
taken in accordance with the conditions
laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping.
Article 14
1. When the transfer of the official address results in a change in the law applicable pursuant to Article 2, a transfer
proposal must be drawn up, filed and
published in accordance with the conditions laid down in Articles 7 and 8.
No decision to transfer may be taken for
two months after publication of the proposal. Any such decision must be taken by
the members of the grouping unanimously. The transfer shall take effect on
the date on which the grouping is registered, in accordance with Article 6, at the
registry for the new official address. That
registration may not be effected until evidence has been produced that the proposal to transfer the official address has
been published.
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2. The termination of a grouping's registration at the registry for its old official
address may not be effected until evidence
has been produced that the grouping has
been registered at the registry for its new
official address.
3. Upon publication of a grouping's new
registration the new official address may
be relied on as against third parties in accordance with the conditions referred to
in Article 9(1); however, as long as the
termination of the grouping's registration
at the registry for the old official address
has not been published, third parties may
continue to rely on the old official address
unless the grouping proves that such third
parties were aware of the new official
address.
4. The laws of a Member State may provide that, as regards groupings registered
under Article 6 in that Member State, the
transfer of an official address which
would result in a change of the law applicable shall not take effect if, within the
two-month period referred to in paragraph 1, a competent authority in that
Member State opposes it. Such opposition
may be based only on grounds of public
interest. Review by a judicial authority
must be possible.
Article 15
1. Where the law applicable to a grouping by virtue of Article 2 provides for the
nullity of that grouping, such nullity must
be established or deciared by judicial decision. However, the court to which the
matter is referred must, where it is possible for the affairs of the grouping to be
put in order, allow time to permit that to
be done.
2. The nullity of a grouping shall entail
its liquidation in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 35.

3. A decision establishing or declaring the
nullity of a grouping may be relied on as
against third parties in accordance with
the conditions laid down in Article 9 (1).
Such a decision shall not of itself affect
the validity of liabilities, owed by or to a
grouping, which originated before it could
be relied on as against third parties in accordance with the conditions laid down in
the previous subparagraph.
Article 16
1. The organs of a grouping shall be the
members acting collectively and the manager or managers.
A contract for the formation of a grouping
may provide for other organs; if it does it
shall determine their powers.
2. The members of a grouping, acting as
a body, may take any decision for the
purpose of achieving the objects of the
grouping.
Article 17
1. Each member shall have one vote. The
contract for the formation of a grouping
may, however, give more than one vote to
certain members, provided that no one
member holds a majority of the votes.
2. A unanimous decision by the members
shall be required to:
(a) alter the objects of a grouping;
(b) alter the number of votes allotted to
each member;
(c) alter the conditions for the taking of
decisions;
(d) extend the duration of a grouping beyond any period fixed in the contract
for the formation of the grouping;
(e) alter the contribution by every member or by some members to the grouping's financing;
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() alter any other obligation of a member, unless otherwise provided by the
contract for the formation of the
grouping;

-

(g) make any alteration to the contract
for the formation of the grouping not
covered by this paragraph, unless otherwise provided by that contract.

he may not belong to the administrative
or management body of a company, may
not manage an undertaking or may not
act as manager of a European Economic
Interest Grouping.

3. Except where this Regulation provides
that decisions must be taken unanimously,
the contract for the formation of a grouping may prescribe the conditions for a
quorum and for a majority, in accordance
with which the decisions, or some of
them, shall be taken. Unless otherwise
provided for by the contract, decisions
shall be taken unanimously.

2. A Member State may, in the case of
groupings registered at their registries
pursuant to Article 6, provide that legal
persons may be managers on condition
that such legal persons designate one or
more natural persons, whose particulars
shall be the subject of the filing provisions
of Article 7 (d) to represent them.

4. On the initiative of a manager or at the
request of a member, the manager or
managers must arrange for the members
to be consulted so that the Latter can take
a decision.

If a Member State exercises this option, it
must provide that the representative or
representatives shall be liable as if they
were themselves managers of the groupings concerned.

Article 18

following a judicial or administrative
decision made or recognized in a
Member State

The restrictions imposed in paragraph 1
shall also apply to those representatives.

Each member shall be entitled to obtain
information from the manager or managers concerning the grouping's business
and to inspect the grouping's books and
business records.

3. The contract for the formation of a
grouping or, failing that, a unanimous decision by the members shall determine the
conditions for the appointment and removal of the manager or managers and
shall lay down their powers.

Article 19

Article 20

1. A grouping shall be managed by one or
more natural persons appointed in the
contract for the formation of the grouping
or by decision of the members.

1. Only the manager or, where there are
two or more, each of the managers shall
represent a grouping in respect of dealings with third parties.

No person may be a manager of a grouping if:

Each of the managers shall bind the
grouping as regards third parties when he
acts on behalf of the grouping, even
where his acts do not fall within the objects of the grouping, unless the grouping
proves that the third party knew or could
not, under the circumstances, have been
unaware that the act fell outside the ob-

- by virtue of the law applicable to him,
or
-

by virtue of the internal law of the
State in which the grouping has its official address, or
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jects of the grouping; publication of the
particulars referred to in Article 5 (c)
shall not of itself be proof thereof.
No limitation on the powers of the manager or managers, whether deriving from
the contract for the formation of the
grouping or from a decision by the members, may be relied on as against third
parties even if it is published.
2. The contract for the formation of the
grouping may provide that the grouping
shall be validly bound only by two or
more managers acting jointly. Such a
clause may be relied on as against third
parties in accordance with the conditions
referred to in Article 9 (1) only if it is
published in accordance with Article 8.
Article 21
1. The profits resulting from a grouping's
activities shall be deemed to be the profits
of the members and shall be apportioned
among them in the proportions laid down
in the contract for the formation of the
grouping or, in the absence of any such
provision, in equal shares.
2. The members of a grouping shall continue to the payment of the amount by
which expenditure exceeds income in the
proportions laid down in the contract for
the formation of the grouping or, in the
absence of any such provision, in equal
shares.
Article 22
1. Any member of a grouping may assign
his participation in the grouping, or a
proportion thereof, either to another
member or to a third party; the assignment shall not take effect without the
unanimous authorization of the other
members.
2. A member of a grouping may use his
participation in the grouping as security

only after the other members have given
their unanimous authorization, unless
otherwise laid down in the contract for
the formation of the grouping. The holder
of the security may not at any time become a member of the grouping by virtue
of that security.
Article 23
No grouping may invite investment by the
public.
Article 24
1. The members of a grouping shall have
unlimited joint and several liability for its
debts and other liabilities of whatever nature. National law shall determine the
consequences of such liability.
2. Creditors may not proceed against a
member for payment in respect of debts
and other liabilities, in accordance with
the conditions laid down in paragraph 1,
before the liquidation of a grouping is
concluded, unless they have first requested the grouping to pay and payment
has not been made within an appropriate
period.
Article 25
Letters, brder forms and similar documents must indicate legibly:
(a) the name of the grouping preceded or
followed either by the words 'European Economic Interest Grouping' or
by the initials 'EEIG', unless those
words or initials already occur in the
name;
(b) the location of the registry referred to
in Article 6, in which the grouping is
registered, together with the number
of the grouping's entry at the registry;
(c) the grouping's official address;
(d) where applicable, that the managers
must act jointly;
(e) where applicable, that the grouping is
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in liquidation, pursuant to Articles
15, 31, 32 or 36.
Every establishment of a grouping, when
registered in accordance with Article 10,
must give the above particulars, together
with those relating to its own registration,
on the documents referred to in the first
paragraph of this Article uttered by it.
Article 26
1. A decision to admit new members shall
be taken unanimously by the members of
the grouping.
2. Every new member shall be liable, in
accordance with the conditions laid down
in Article 24, for the grouping's debts and
other liabilities, including those arising
out of the grouping's activities before his
admission.
He may, however, be exempted by a
clause in the contract for the formation of
the grouping or in the instrument of admission from the payment of debts and
other liabilities which originated before
his admission. Such a clause may be relied on as against third parties, under the
conditions referred to in Article 9 (1),
only if it is published in accordance with
Article 8.
Article 27
1. A member of a grouping may withdraw in accordance with the conditions
laid down in the contract for the formation of a grouping or, in the absence of
such conditions, with the unanimous
agreement of the other members.
Any member of a grouping may, in addition, withdraw on just and proper
grounds.
2. Any member of a grouping may be expelled for the reasons listed in the contract for the formation of the grouping
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and, in any case, if he seriously fails in
his obligations or if he causes or threatens
to cause serious disruption in the operation of the grouping.
Such expulsion may occur only by the decision of a court to which joint application
has been made by a majority of the other
members, unless otherwise provided by
the contract for the formation of a
grouping.
Article 28
1. A member of a grouping shall cease to
belong to it on death or when he no
longer complies with the conditions laid
down in Article 4 (1).
In addition, a Member State may provide,
for the purposes of its liquidation, winding up, insolvency or cessation of payments laws, that a member shall cease to
be a member of any grouping at the moment determined by those laws.
2. In the event of the death of a natural
person who is a member of a grouping,
no person may become a member in his
place except under the conditions laid
down in the contract for the formation of
the grouping or, failing that, with the
unanimous agreement of the remaining
members.
Article 29
As soon as a member ceases to belong to a
grouping, the manager or managers must
inform the other members of that fact;
they must also take the steps required as
listed in Articles 7 and 8. In addition, any
person concerned may take those steps.
Article 30
Except where the contract for the formation of a grouping provides otherwise and
without prejudice to the rights acquired
by a person under Articles 22 (1) or 28
(2), a grouping shall continue to exist for
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the remaining members after a member
has ceased to belong to it, in accordance
with the conditions laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping or
determined by unanimous decision of the
members in question.
Article 31
1. A grouping may be wound up by a decision of its members ordering its winding
up. Such a decision shall be taken unanimously, unless otherwise laid down in the
contract for the formation of the
grouping.
2. A grouping must be wound up by a decision of its members:
(a) noting the expiry of the period fixed
in the contract for the formation of
the grouping or the existence of any
other cause for winding up provided
for in the contract, or
(b) noting the accomplishment of the
grouping's purpose or the impossibility of pursuing it further.
Where, three months after one of the situations referred to in the first subparagraph has occurred, a members' decision
establishing the winding up of the grouping has not been taken, any member may
petition the court to order winding up.
3. A grouping must also be wound up by
a decision of its members or of the remaining member when the conditions laid
down in Article 4 (2) are no longer
fulfilled.
4. After a grouping has been wound up
by decision of its members, the manager
or managers must take the steps required
as listed in Articles 7 and 8. In addition,
any person concerned may take those
steps.

Article 32
1. On application by any person concerned or by a competent authority, in the
event of the infringement of Articles 3, 12
or 31 (3), the court must order a grouping
to be wound up, unless its affairs can be
and are put in order before the court has
delivered a substantive ruling.
2. On applications by a member, the
court may order a grouping to be wound
up on just and proper grounds.
3. A Member State may provide that the
court may, on application by a competent
authority, order the winding up of a
grouping which has its official address in
the State to which that authority belongs,
wherever the grouping acts in contravention of that State's public interest, if the
law of that State provides for such a possibility in respect of registered companies
or other legal bodies subject to it.
Article 33
When a member ceases to belong to a
grouping for any reason other than the
assignment of his rights in accordance
with the conditions laid down in Article
22 (1), the value of his rights and obligations shall be determined taking into account the assets and liabilities of the
grouping as they stand when he ceases to
belong to it.
The value of the rights and obligations of
a departing member may not be fixed in
advance.
Article 34
Without prejudice to Article 37 (1), any
member who ceases to belong to a grouping shall remain answerable, in accordance with the conditions laid down in
Article 24, for the debts and other liabilities arising out of the grouping's activities
before he ceased to be a member.
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Article 35

Article 38

1. The winding up of a grouping shall
entail its liquidation.

Where a grouping carries on any activity
in a Member State in contravention of
that State's public interest, a competent
authority of that State may prohibit that
activity. Review of that competent authority's decision by a judicial authority shall
be possible.

2. The liquidation of a grouping and the
conclusion of its liquidation shall be governed by national law.
3. A grouping shall retain its capacity,
within the meaning of Article 1 (2), until
its liquidation is concluded.
4. The liquidator or liquidators shall take
the steps required as listed in Articles 7
and 8.

Article 36
Groupings shall be subject to national
laws governing insolvency and cessation
of payments. The commencement of proceedings against a grouping on grounds of
its insolvency or cessation of payments
shall not by itself cause the commencement of such proceedings against its
members.

Article 37
1. A period of limitation of five years after the publication, pursuant to Article 8,
of notice of a member's ceasing to belong
to a grouping shall be substituted for any
longer period which may be laid down by
the relevant national law for actions
against that member in connection with
debts and other liabilities arising out of
the grouping's activities before he ceased
to be a member.
2. A period of limitation of five years after the publication, pursuant to Article 8,
of notice of the conclusion of the liquidation of a grouping shall be substituted for
any longer period which may be laid
down by the relevant national law for actions against a member of the grouping in
connection with debts and other liabilities
arising out of the grouping's activities.

Article 39
1. The Member States shall designate the
registry or registries responsible for effecting the registration referred to in Articles
6 and 10 and shall lay down the rules
governing registration. They shall prescribe the conditions under which the documents referred to in Articles 7 and 10
shall be filed. They shall ensure that the
documents and particulars referred to in
Article 8 are published in the appropriate
official gazette of the Member State in
which the grouping has its official address, and may prescribe the manner of
publication of the documents and particulars referred to in Article 8 (c).
The Member States shall also ensure that
anyone may, at the appropriate registry
pursuant to Article 6 or, where appropriate, Article 10, inspect the documents referred to in Article 7 and obtain, even by
post, full or partial copies thereof.
The Member States may provide for the
payment of fees in connection with the
operations referred to in the preceding
subparagraphs; those fees may not, however, exceed the administrative cost
thereof.
2. The Member States shall ensure that
the information to be published in the OfficialJournal of the European Communities pursuant to Article 11 is forwarded to
the Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities within one month
of its publication in the official gazette referred to in paragraph 1.
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3. The Member States shall provide for
appropriate penalties in the event of failure to comply with the provisions of Articles 7, 8 and 10 on disclosure and in the
event of failure to comply with Article 25.

function shall be:

Article 40

(a) to facilitate, without prejudice to Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty, application of this Regulation through regular consultation dealing in particular
with practical problems arising in
connection with its application;

The profits or losses resulting from the
activities of a grouping shall be taxable
only in the hands of its members.

(b) to advise the Commission, if necessary, on additions or amendments to
this Regulation.

Article 41

2. The Contact Committee shall be composed of representatives of the Member
States and representatives of the Commission. The chairman shall be a representative of the Commission. The Commission
shall provide the secretariat.

1. The Member States shall take the
measures required by virtue of Article 39
before 1 July 1989. They shall immediately communicate them to the
Commission.
2. For information purposes, the Member
States shall inform the Commission of the
classes of natural persons, companies,
firms and other legal bodies which they
prohibit from participating in groupings
pursuant to Article 4 (4). The Commission shall inform the other Member
States.
Article 42
1. Upon the adoption of this Regulation,
a Contact Committee shall be set up
under the auspices of the Commission. Its

3. The Contact Committee shall be convened by its chairman either on his own
initiative or at the request of one of its
members.
Article 43
This Regulation shall enter into force on
the third day following its publication in
the Official Journal of the European
Communities.
It shall apply from 1 July 1989, with the
exception of Articles 39, 41 and 42 which
shall apply as from the entry into force of
the Regulation.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States.

